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ABSTRACT 
 What are the conditions and factors affecting intrastate conflict recurrence? This 
thesis tests the effect of the type of conflict outcome, the use of peacekeeping forces, and 
the presence of lootable resources on the recurrence of intrastate conflict. 
 Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) datasets, this thesis performs a 
linear regression analysis for internal conflicts from 1946 to 2014. Results confirm that 
the risk of conflict recurrence reduces over time. Peace agreements show a lower 
likelihood of conflict recurrence than military victories. 
 The thesis finds ambiguous results for lootable and non-lootable resources. 
Lootable diamonds, opium/poppy, and petroleum correlate with more conflict recurrence, 
whereas non-lootable diamonds correlates with less recurrence. Coca, cannabis, and 
opium/poppy production yielded ambiguous results. The presence of peacekeeping forces 
does not demonstrate a statistically significant effect on conflict recurrence. 
 Analyzing the conflict in Colombia, this work finds that illicit drugs and onshore 
oil production have led to conflict recurrence. The study also shows that peace 
agreements have helped Colombia avoid conflict recurrence. Overall, the study shows 
some dynamics of conflict recurrence and provides new venues for future research.  
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Intrastate conflicts are the most frequent and long-lasting form of war in the world. 
In the last ten years, many regions have had countries with some kind of intrastate armed 
conflict occurring. Remarkably, the most critical characteristic of these conflicts is their 
tendency to recur. Governments have tried to end internal armed conflicts, but the risk of 
resurgence1 is present in every confrontation. In case after case, after peace negotiations and 
military victories, the evidence indicates that the odds are against a lasting peace.2 Why do 
many peace treaties and military victories not last? This thesis seeks to identify the factors 
influencing intrastate conflict recurrence. Using a statistical analysis approach, this thesis 
reviews whether the type of conflict outcome (military victory and negotiated settlement), 
the use of peacekeeping forces, and the presence of lootable resources influence the 
likelihood of conflict resurgence. The thesis tests the effect of different types of lootable 
resources to verify their interaction with the types of conflict outcome. The thesis 
demonstrates that different types of conflict outcomes lead to different levels of recurrence 
risk. Additionally, the thesis results do not show a correlation in terms of the effect of 
peacekeeping forces in reducing conflict recurrence. It also shows that the effect of lootable 
resources is not conclusive, especially regarding illegal drug production. 
The thesis ultimately applies the findings from this research to the Colombian 
internal conflict case to analyze the country’s risk of recurrence as an example to provide 
policy recommendations for those countries that are in the process of establishing a lasting 
peace. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Intrastate conflict, with its different forms (e.g., insurgencies, civil wars, revolutions, 
and guerrilla campaigns), is the most frequent form of conflict in the world. From 1945 to 
1999, there were 127 intrastate conflicts in the world, five times more than the 25 interstate 
                                                 
1 This study uses the words “resurgence,” “resume,” and “relapse” as synonym of “recurrence.” 
2 Sebastian Merz, “Less Conflict, More Peace? Understanding Trends in Conflict Persistence,” 
Conflict, Security & Development 12, no. 3 (2012): 210, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.703532. 
The author states that the rate of conflict recurrence is in “60 percent in the new millennium.” 
2 
conflicts that occurred in the same period.3 Intrastate conflicts also caused nearly five times 
more deaths than interstate wars.4  
Several scholars report that intrastate conflicts tend to occur in the same countries, 
and that once a civil war has occurred in a country, that country is at high risk to have 
another episode of civil war. The 127 civil wars in the period 1945-1999 took place in 73 
states. These data indicate that several states had more than one episode of civil war during 
that period.5 According to the World Development Report 2011, “of the 103 countries that 
experienced some form of civil war between 1945-2009,” 59 recurred.6 This report shows 
that the incidence of intrastate conflict recurrence is growing and that, during the 2000s, 90 
percent of the intrastate conflicts occurred in a country with a previous conflict.7 As a 
possible explanation, another study highlights how conflicts and conflict episodes that 
started from 1992 to 2012 have been short8 but presents a higher tendency to recur because 
they ended more frequently with a less stable negotiated settlement.9 Thus, it is necessary to 
understand why intrastate conflicts recur. 
Scholars have used different approaches to investigate the reasons why intrastate 
conflicts recur. Some studies are focused on differentiating between the types of outcome.10 
Other studies focus on the participation of international peacekeeping forces as guarantors or 
                                                 
3 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000534. 
4 Michael Quinn, David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil 
War Recurrence,” International Interactions 33, no. 2 (2007): 168, https://doi.org/10.1080/
03050620701277673. 
5 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75. 
6 Barbara F. Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,” Background 
paper, World Development Report 2011 (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 13, 2010), 1, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9069/WDR2011_0008.pdf?sequence=1. 
7 Walter, 2. 
8 Merz, “Less Conflict, More Peace? Understanding Trends in Conflict Persistence,” 220. 
9 Merz, 212. 
10 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 189. 
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enforcers of settlements.11 A third approach scholars have used to assess conflict recurrence 
is the existence of natural resources available to fuel the conflict.12 
Understanding this phenomenon is especially crucial for countries that are in the 
midst of ending an intrastate conflict and are heavily invested in ensuring that the conflict 
does not recur. This thesis uses the 50-year-long Colombian internal conflict to show the 
factors and conditions affecting conflict recurrence present in this country, and to provide 
policy recommendations that could apply to produce a lasting peace.    
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is what are the conditions and 
factors affecting conflict recurrence and lasting peace in intrastate confrontations? This 
question also leads to asking if there is a relationship between the conflict outcome and its 
recurrence. From that point, the other associated inquiries are about the effect of lootable 
resources, and the effect of peacekeeping forces in negotiated settlements. Once these 
questions are answered, the final query is how can countries like Colombia avoid the 
resurgence of a new generation of violent armed groups and create a lasting peace? 
To answer these questions, this research uses a statistical analysis approach 
conducting a logistic regression. It tests the relationship between conflict recurrence and the 
types of conflict termination. The research tests the differences between military victory and 
peace agreement, and their interaction with the existence of peacekeeping forces. It also tests 
the effect of the existence and access to lootable resources for the actors in the conflict. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Different scholars use different criteria to define when a conflict ends and whether 
it ended in a military victory or negotiated settlement.13 Regarding the criteria selection, 
                                                 
11 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace 
Research 45, no. 4 (2008): 461, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308091356. 
12 Vita Roy, “Natural Resource Production and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 41, no. 1 (2018): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1266896. 
13 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration 
of Peace After Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 (2004): 277, footnote 23, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x. 
4 
the conflict outcome coding will vary among different datasets. For example, some 
internal conflicts that concluded with military victories are followed by a negotiation, 
where the main actors agreed in the terms to allow the transition to civil life for the 
defeated combatants. In these cases, the criteria selected for coding the conflict 
termination can create two different outcomes with different termination dates. Some 
datasets can code the termination as a military victory, whereas others can code it as a 
peace agreement. Similarly, the threshold selected to code the conflict onset and outcome 
can create differences in the dates and the types of outcome. Nicholas Sambanis mentions 
the complexity of coding civil war and, in the supplement of his work “What is Civil 
War,” he provides a comparative analysis of the differences in coding and the possible 
problems that can arise.14 In order to capture with higher precision the start and end of 
most internal conflicts, and eliminate the possible false outcomes that do not reach a 
higher threshold, the thesis will employ the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
datasets.15 
This thesis examines only the internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2014 
regardless of the conflict’s political qualifications or the political aims of the parties 
involved. The research is conducted primarily at the country level. In order to be included 
in this study, the internal conflict has to match the threshold of 25 conflict-related deaths 
per year, as coded by the UCDP,16 which is the source for the conflict data set. For this 
reason, no distinction is made between the different types of conflicts, whether they were 
civil war, intrastate armed conflict, or other types of rebellion. This thesis does not try to 
qualify if the rebel side fulfills the category of organized armed group in the sense of the 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.  
                                                 
14 Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational 
Definition,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): Supplement. 
15 Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace 
Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 619, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039005007. 
16 Gleditsch et al., 619. The authors define “armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths.” 
5 
Since the thesis reviews the effect of third-party intervention by enforcers or 
peacekeeping forces, which incorporate the use of armed forces from different states, the 
thesis considers the cases where third-party states intervene in the studied conflict to 
facilitate negotiated settlements. The thesis does not cover those conflicts aimed at 
decolonization, which are in a certain way different from the current intrastate conflicts 
and are considered interstate conflict for the purpose of this study. Additionally, the 
thesis does not research other factors that can influence conflict recurrence, such as 
external support to the main actors of the conflict, funding from the diaspora, the reasons 
for spoilers and splinters, or the provisions in peace agreements, among others.  
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into five chapters, with Chapter I as the introduction to the 
study. Chapter II describes the research that scholars use to analyze the existence of 
conflict recurrence to identify the main factors that explain this phenomenon, and 
proposes six hypotheses. Chapter III covers the research methods and statistical analysis 
results to examine the six proposed hypotheses. Chapter IV addresses the Colombian 
conflict as a case study for the present research. Finally, Chapter V provides the analysis 
of the results and recommendations for policy making to reduce the risk of conflict 
recurrence in general, and in the Colombian case in particular. 
E. TRANSLATIONS 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Spanish and French are by the 
author.  
6 
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II. ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
In order to provide a framework for theory review, this chapter covers three 
identified currents of research about conflict recurrence, which are important for the 
purpose of this thesis. The first two currents are based on two conflict outcomes - military 
victory and negotiated settlement. The first, military victory, compares government 
victory and rebel victory. The second, negotiated settlement, compares the effect of a 
third-party guarantor of the settlement versus agreements that do not include provisions 
for an external guarantor. The third current to review in this chapter is the existence of 
natural resources in the territory of the country, and whether they are lootable or non-
lootable, easy to obstruct, or illegally produced. This approach is intended to facilitate the 
review of factors that affect the risk of conflict recurrence. This chapter ends by 
introducing six hypotheses identified to frame the statistical analysis conducted in 
Chapter III.  
A. STUDIES ON MILITARY VICTORY OUTCOMES 
When analyzing conflict recurrence, several scholars have found that some types 
of conflict outcomes have a different probability of recurrence. Typically, intrastate 
conflict outcomes are coded as military victories or negotiated settlements.17 When 
analyzing these two types of outcomes, a study conducted using a data set with 46 civil 
wars in the period 1945-1993 found that 50 percent of the negotiated settlements had at 
least a second conflict onset, compared with a 15 percent chance of conflict recurrence 
for the conflicts that ended with military victory.18 The propensity for military victories 
to have a lower tendency of conflict recurrence was confirmed also in cases after the end 
of the Cold War.19 The reason for this lower conflict resurgence rate has been explained 
thusly: military victories clearly identify a stronger side, whereas negotiated settlements 
                                                 
17 Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” ed. Roy 
Licklider, American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 684. 
18 Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” 685. 
19 Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace 
After Civil War,” 273. 
8 
create conditions of “dual sovereignty”20 associated with information problems about 
each side’s real relative capacity.21  
Military victory, either by the government or rebels, indicates to the opposing side 
that the winning side was better able to use its resources to control the population and the 
contested space, thus increasing both sides’ information about their relative capacity and 
reducing the margin for dual sovereignty. Something interesting about military victories 
in these studies is that there is a different risk of recurrence between government and 
rebel victories. Some studies show that among the military victories, the conflicts that 
ended with a rebel victory have a lower incidence of conflict recurrence, compared to 
conflicts that ended with a government victory.22 Besides these studies’ results, in 
another study using the UCDP data sets, Joakim Kreutz suggests that a government 
victory has a lower incidence of recurrence than a rebel victory, and asserts that the result 
was statistically significant only for government victories.23 Kreutz’s results gives space 
to think that other factors can be influencing the tendency for conflict recurrence in these 
outcomes, which this thesis will explore.  
Among the cases where a government victory produced a lasting peace is the 
Bolivian conflict with the National Liberation Army (ELN), which ended in 1967 with 
the capture and death of Ernesto “Che” Guevara at the hands of the Bolivian Army.24 
Among the cases in which the rebels won and secured a lasting peace are the Costa Rican 
                                                 
20 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 173. 
The authors explain “a condition of dual sovereignty exists when an opposition group has the 
organizational capacity and popular support to initiate and sustain an armed challenge” [and as in 
settlement] both fighting parties “retain their organizational autonomy,” the dual sovereignty persists 
making possible a conflict renewal. Military victory reduces this condition. 
21 Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science 12, no. 
1 (2009): 257, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.135301. According to Walter, both 
fighting actors have different, and probably erroneous, information about their relative strength. This 
information problem leads them to incorrectly over estimate their probability of victory.  
22 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 186. 
23 Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 247, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0022343309353108. 
24 Philip E. Wise, “Pragmatic Idealism:  Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s Strategic Choice for Bolivia” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 1, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55558. 
9 
civil war of 1948, in which the government of President Teodoro Picado was defeated 
after he refused to recognize the election of opposition candidate Otilio Ulate;25 and the 
Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro that defeated the Batista dictatorship in December 
1958.26  
B. STUDIES ON PEACE AGREEMENTS AND PEACEKEEPING FORCES 
When either government or rebel forces are not able to militarily defeat the 
opposing side, the condition of stalemate drives to negotiation as the way to stop the 
fighting. Scholars have studied the various types of negotiated settlements in order to 
identify why some succeed and others do not. As mentioned before, “military victories do 
not last as long as negotiated settlements.”27 Some scholars have argued the continuation 
of dual sovereignty conditions among the reasons for peace agreements’ higher frequency 
failure.28 When analyzing the conditions that make settlement successful, Caroline 
Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie showed the presence of power sharing and third-party 
enforcers contributes to “enduring peace among former adversaries.”29 In that study, 
Hartzell and Hoddie concluded that with a higher number of power-sharing arrangements 
(political, territorial, military, and economic), the risk of a return to civil war reduces by 
53 percent for each additional category of power sharing. They further conclude that the 
presence of an external enforcer will “reduce the risk of settlement failure by 83 
percent.”30 These findings suggest that the use of a third-party enforcer, such as 
                                                 
25 Fernando Sánchez, “Democracy Alter War: Causes and Consequences of the 1948 Civil War in 
Costa Rica,” 2004, 5, Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint 
Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala University (13-18 April 2004), https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/
9562ceb2-3cd4-4c13-9981-c562fe96ebfe.pdf. 
26 Christopher Paul, Paths to Victory : Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, RR-291/1-OSD (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND2013), 27, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html. 
27 Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” 685. 
28 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 173. 
29 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil 
War Conflict Management,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (2003): 318, https://doi.org/
10.1111/1540-5907.00022. 
30 Hartzell and Hoddie, 327. 
10 
peacekeeping forces, are an effective way to reduce the dual sovereignty effect and to 
increase the government’s and rebels’ commitment to respect the settlement. 
The use of third-party enforcers is especially useful on protracted conflicts where 
neither the government nor rebels have been able to impose their will over the other side, 
resulting in a type of stalemate. In these cases, the combination of a third-party broker for 
the negotiation and peacekeeping forces to reinforce the agreement has a higher success 
probability.31 A research conducted by Quinn, Mason, and Gurses found that for the 
conflicts they studied, “the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely it is to break 
down.” They suggest that peacekeepers can buy the time needed to reduce the likelihood 
of a conflict relapse.32 This finding about the effect of time in the probability of 
recurrence is interesting because, although the authors did not present the results 
disaggregated by each type of outcome, it can provide elements of analysis for policy 
making. 
Several internal conflicts that concluded with military victories still led to a 
negotiation where the conflicting parties agreed in the terms to end the fight or to make 
the transition to civil life for the losing-side combatants. This is important because 
different scholars use different criteria to define when a conflict ended in military victory 
or negotiated settlement.33 
Among the cases where a peace agreement succeeded in bringing an end to 
internal conflict is the Nicaraguan conflict with the Contras (1981-1990).34 Following the 
Sandinistas’ victory that defeated the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza in 1979,35 a conflict 
recurrence started in 1981 between the Sandinista government and the Contras. The U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency backed the Contras with training, weapons, and money, and 
                                                 
31 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 189. 
32 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, 189. 
33 Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace 
After Civil War,” 277.   
34 The Nicaragua-Contras is one of the cases where different scholars differ in the outcome 
classification. Hartzel and Collier, Licklider, and Walter code it as negotiated settlement, whereas the 
UCDP code it as a ceasefire and Paul et al. code it as a rebel victory.  
35 Paul, Paths to Victory : Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 49. 
11 
in 1989, after several years of negotiation, the conflict concluded with a peace settlement, 
which also included the participation of United Nations peacekeeping forces.36 
The Sierra Leone conflict with the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone 
(RUF) is an example of a conflict where several rebel factions joined to take control of 
the nation, and after a multilateral UN military intervention, a peace agreement was 
signed in 2001 after 10 years of fighting, providing peace in this still-fragile nation.37 
This conflict was characterized by high levels of poverty and the presence of lootable 
diamonds, which leads to the third type of case this thesis addresses: the lootable 
resources dimension of conflict recurrence. 
C. STUDIES ON THE EFFECT OF LOOTABLE RESOURCES  
Several studies have mentioned the relationship between armed conflict and 
natural resources.38 Collier and Hoeffler relate the availability of finance to the 
feasibility of rebellion and interpret the opportunity for extortion of commodities as a 
finance source.39 That condition seems to induce shorter peace periods after a conflict 
ends by reducing the duration of peace years to almost half in conflicts related to natural 
resources compared to non-natural resources-related conflicts.40 In fact, Rustad and 
Binningsbø argue that “peace after natural resource conflicts fails faster than after other 
conflicts.”41  
Another resources-related factor increasing the risk of conflict recurrence during 
and after a military victory or a negotiated settlement is the existence of an illegal trade 
                                                 
36 “ONUCA - Central America,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, https://peacekeeping.un.org/
sites/default/files/past/onuca.htm. 
37 “UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone - Background,” United Nations, United 
Nations Peacekeeping, 2009, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/background.html. 
38 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, 
no. 4 (2004): 565, https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064. 
39 Collier and Hoeffler, 588. 
40 Siri Aas Rustad and Helga Malmin Binningsbø, “A Price Worth Fighting for? Natural Resources 
and Conflict Recurrence,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 4 (2012): 540, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0022343312444942. 
41 Rustad and Binningsbø, 543. 
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funding the insurgency effort. War is costly, and the possibility of accessing resources for 
maintaining the military effort is a point that governments and insurgencies have to 
consider when making their decision to return to fighting or to keep the status quo of the 
outcome. Here, the effect of fighting-funding sources depends on the ability of the 
fighting actors to access them while the struggle is still ongoing. In the same way that 
international funding cuts affect the actors’ decision to continue fighting or settle with no 
conflict recurrence,42 the access to other types of resources43 tends to fuel conflict 
relapse. 
When rebel groups have access to illegal sources of money, they find it easier to 
finance their fight. These additional funds reduce the relative power’s difference with the 
government, increasing the conflict duration. Fearon affirms that when rebel groups use 
contraband (like cocaine, opium, or diamonds) to finance themselves, the estimated 
duration of a civil war rose from a mean of 8.8 years to 48.2 years in the cases he 
studied.44 Once rebels construct an illicit-trading network45 that provides constant 
money flow from contraband, this network creates additional incentives to protect that 
source of money, thus increasing the conflict length and challenging the government to 
retain its freedom of action.46 This contraband network becomes an objective itself for 
some factions in the rebel group, and that objective remains after the conflict settlement, 
which increases the risk of conflict recurrence. In this sense, Wennmann argues that 
“parallel [illegal] economies contribute to the undermining of PCPB [post-conflict 
                                                 
42 Achim Wennmann, “Getting Armed Groups to the Table: Peace Processes, the Political Economy 
of Conflict and the Mediated State,” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 6 (2009): 1130, https://doi.org/10.1080/
01436590903037416. 
43 Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” 248. 
44 James D Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?,” Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 284, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043770. The author used a dataset 
including 128 cases of civil wars occurring between 1945 and 1999. 
45 Roy, “Natural Resource Production and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence,” 18. 
46 U.S. National Defense University, Convergence : Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age 
of Globalization (Washington, DC: Published for the Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies by National Defense University Press; sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2013), 176. 
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peacebuilding] by diverting resources away from reconstruction and state-building, and 
by empowering actors with little interest in peace.”47  
On the other hand, the government’s access to resources should increase its 
governing and control capacity, and consequently, should increase its probability of 
defeating a rebel group and have a more stable victory.48 But the existence of resources 
accessible to both government and rebel parties seems to favor the rebel side. This is 
explained by Roy, according to the way the resources (legal or illegal) are extracted and 
transported.49 In general, lootable resources like gold and secondary diamonds are easy 
to extract and do not require a big investment and infrastructure for their exploitation, 
allowing the rebel side to obtain funds from the extraction or by controlling the means of 
extraction. Non-lootable resources, like primary diamonds and oil, require big 
investments and infrastructure that only a government or a big company can provide. 
This leads to the other characteristic of the resources: how easily their transportation can 
be obstructed. The way the resource is transported from the extraction zone to the 
exporting ports or the point of transformation determines if the rebels are able to obstruct 
it. This means that even some non-lootable resources, such as onshore oil transported by 
pipeline, can be obstructed if their transportation uses means or routes where the rebels 
exert some level of control or presence.50 Under this condition, easy-to-obstruct 
resources should have the same effect as lootable resources, which increase the rebel 
side’s access to funding and the risk of conflict recurrence. 
Among the cases where resources-related conflicts had a successful outcome is 
Sierra Leone. In this conflict, the control of the diamond fields was “the primary 
motivation for the insurgents.”51 As mentioned before, this country had a successful 
peace agreement with a military intervention that allowed the country to remain free of 
                                                 
47 Achim Wennmann, “Resourcing the Recurrence of Intrastate Conflict: Parallel Economies and 
Their Implications for Peacebuilding,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005): 479, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0967010605060450. 
48 Roy, “Natural Resource Production and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence,” 3. 
49 Roy, 5. 
50 Roy, 3-4. 
51 Paul, Paths to Victory : Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 58-59. 
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internal conflict. The Peruvian Shining Path conflict (1980-1992) is another case of a 
relatively successful outcome in a country with oil and coca production. In this conflict, 
the government confronted the Shining Path Maoist guerrillas, which since 1983 initiated 
its participation in narcotics trafficking.52 After capturing Shining Path leader, Abimael 
Guzmán,53 the Peruvian government was able to target and reduce the insurgent 
organization to a very low level of activity. Even today, remnants of Shining Path have 
continued their activity in isolated regions of the country, conducting guerrilla warfare in 
small scale.  
D. DISCUSSION 
This review shows how separate scholars have varying explanations for intrastate 
conflict recurrence. Their analyses focus on two types of conflict settlement—peace 
agreement or military victory—to identify the relationship between conflict termination 
type and conflict recurrence. In general, these studies agree that peace agreements are 
more likely to have conflict recurrence than military victory. Among military victories, 
there is no consensus whether government or rebel victory has a higher risk of 
recurrence. Among peace agreements, there is some accord that the use of a third-party 
enforcer or peacekeeping forces has the lowest probability of conflict recurrence. 
Another factor risking the peace is actors’ access to natural resources to fund 
conflict relapse. The use of illegal contraband and the exploitation of lootable and 
obstructable resources by remnants of the rebel group create incentives to continue to 
control specific regions, and ensure that the resource flow keeps an armed group 
supplied, which increases its will and capacity to resume the fight.  
One common factor reducing the risk of conflict recurrence in both military 
victory and negotiated settlement is the effect of time. The longer the peace lasts, the 
lower the risk of recurrence. This condition seems to explain better the reason why 
                                                 
52 Gabriela. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, The 
Washington Papers, 144 (New York: Praeger, 1990), 123. 
53 Paul, Paths to Victory : Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 52. 
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negotiated settlements experience a reduced risk of recurrence when a third-party 
enforcer is present. 
In order to test the relevance of these factors to internal conflict recurrence, this 
research uses a statistical analysis approach to explore the relationship between conflict 
recurrence and the types of conflict termination, and its interaction with the existence of 
peacekeeping forces and lootable resources. The analysis tests the following six 
hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis is related to conflict outcomes. The hypothesis checks the 
incidence of conflict recurrence for military victory for both government and rebel 
victory and peace agreement outcomes.54 Consequently, the first hypothesis tests the 
following: 
H1: The type of conflict outcome affects its recurrence risk. 
Among the tools the international community uses to address intrastate conflicts 
is the use of peacekeeping forces. Several studies show a positive effect of peacekeeping 
forces in the reduction of conflict recurrence risk, whereas other studies criticize their 
effectiveness. Consequently, this study tests the following hypothesis: 
H2: The participation of peacekeeping forces reduces the risk of conflict 
recurrence. 
Similarly, the duration of the peace is also related to the probability of conflict 
recurrence. In general, longer peace years generate a lower risk of conflict recurrence. 
The third hypothesis tests the effect on conflict recurrence of the peace duration in the 
years after a conflict resolution: 
H3: The longer the duration of peace, the lower the probability of conflict 
recurrence. 
Since H1 tests the conflict recurrence risk by conflict outcome and H3 tests it by 
the effect of peace over time, it is reasonable to evaluate how the interaction between the 
                                                 
54 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 188. 
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outcome type and the duration of the peace years that outcome produced affect the 
probability of conflict recurrence; hence, the fourth hypothesis to test is: 
H4: The probability of conflict recurrence varies over time depending on the type 
of previous conflict outcome. 
As mentioned before, an important number of studies talk about the effect of 
natural resources on conflict recurrence. The literature on this topic shows that illegal 
economies, easy-to-obstruct resources, and easy-to-extract resources tend to increase the 
probability of conflict recurrence by providing funds to the rebels to fuel the conflict, 
whereas difficult-to-extract resources tend to provide more resources to governments 
interested in fighting the internal threat and creating better conditions for their citizens to 
reduce the population’s grievances. For the purpose of this thesis, illegal, easy-to-
obstruct, and easily extractive resources are considered lootable resources, and difficult-
to-extract resources are considered non-lootable resources. Based on those findings, two 
more hypotheses are tested in this study: 
H5: Lootable resources increase the probability of conflict recurrence. 
H6: Non-lootable resources reduce the probability of conflict recurrence.  
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III. DATA ANALYSIS OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT 
RECURRENCE  
A. DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
The universe of internal conflicts for this study is based on the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset version 2-2015.55 The technique to determine the existence of an 
internal conflict is consequently based on the UCDP 25-deaths-per-year threshold. This 
dataset provides the outcome information used in the present study, including outcome 
type and dates, among others. The UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence 
Dataset56 provides the information on conflict incidence and onset updated by Marie 
Allanson, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér.57 The information for peacekeeping 
operations comes from the Virgina Fortna Peacekeeping and the Peacekept dataset, using 
the time-constant dummy variable for peacekeeping. This dataset has data on 
peacekeeping in civil wars from 1989 to 2004.58  The information for the lootable 
resurces comes from three different sources. The lootable and non-lootable diamond 
production information source is the DIADATA, which includes the dummy variable for 
non-lootable (primary) and lootable (secondary) diamonds used in this work.59 For 
onshore and offshore oil production, the source is PETRODATA, which has the variables 
used in this work for onshore and offshore oil production.60 For the illegal opium poppy, 
                                                 
55 Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination 
Dataset.” 
56 Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014,” Journal of Peace 
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58 Virginia Page. Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War 
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60 Päivi Lujala, Jan Ketil Rod, and Nadia Thieme, “Fighting over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset,” 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 24, no. 3 (August 7, 2007): 239-56, https://doi.org/10.1080/
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coca bush, and cannabis drugs production, the source is DRUGDATA, which has the 
shapefiles for the countries in the world that have had any of these three illegal drugs in 
production.61 The countries’ economic information is obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators,62 and the political information related to the level of 
democracy is from the Center for Systemic Peace Polity IV Project.63 These data were 
updated when possible with other sources to match the research period from 1946 to 2014 
(latest year available). These datasets are merged by country and year in order to use 
country-year as the unit of analysis. The regression is conducted with R software,64 using  
the fitting of the generalized linear models function, which gives the description of the 
linear predictor and the margin of error.  
Table 1 provides the description of the data collected for the research. The data 
collected includes 205 countries and has a total of 11,511 country-year observations. In 
the 69 years of the study period (1964-2014), 104 countries had 366 internal conflicts 
onsets. For these countries, it respresented a total of 1,423 years with conflict, with an 
average conflict duration of 13.7 years. The data includes 41 peace agreements, 89 
government victories, and 31 rebel victories. Based on this dataset, the expected duration 
of peace after these outcomes is 18.2 years for peace agreements, 15.9 years for 
government victories, and 14.3 years for rebel victories. For the purpose of this study, the 
statistical analysis uses the years following the first conflict outcome for each country 
that experienced internal conflict in the studied period. The extraction of the countries 
with no conflict and the years before the first conflict outcome in the study period leaves 
3,991 country-years and 262 internal conflict recurrences for the regression models. 
                                                 
61 Halvard. Buhaug and Päivi Lujala, “Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative 
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Table 1. Description of data 
DATA INFORMATION 
Observation N 
Total country-years 11,511 
Country-years following 1st onset 3,991 
Number of countries 205 
Years of the period (1946-2014) 69 
Countries with internal conflict 104 
Years with conflict 1,423 
Average conflict duration in years 13.7  
Conflicts onsets 366 
Conflict recurrences 262 
Outcomes N Average peace years by outcome 
Peace agreement 41 18.2 
Government victory 89 15.9 
Rebel victory 31 14.3 
 
B. RESEARCH VARIABLES 
1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is conflict recurrence after an intrastate conflict outcome. 
It is a dichotomous variable that codes 1 for every country-year with the onset of another 
conflict, otherwise it codes the country-year as 0. The definition of the onset of a conflict 
(“conflict onset”) used in this study is based on that from UCDP, which is the first year 
that a “contested incompatibility” inside a state’s territory, between the government of 
the state and a non-state actor, resulting in “at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar-
year.”65 This variable is lagged by one year using the conflict onset from the UCDP 
                                                 
65 Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” 619. 
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Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset to code the recurrence in the studied 
1946-2014 period.66  
2. Independent Variables 
To test the hypotheses, the model uses several independent variables from the 
different datasets:  
• Peace years: This is the number of peace years since all of the internal 
conflicts ended in the country. 
• Type of outcome: This is the way in which every conflict ended. To be 
valid, the outcome should be followed by a one-year period with the 
threshold of deaths per year below the number 25. It indicates that the year 
that a conflict reached its outcome in the respective category. Three types 
of outcomes are examined: 
o Government victory  
o Rebel victory 
o Peace agreement 
• Peacekeeping forces: This variable include the cases where peacekeeping 
forces or third-party enforcers were used in a conflict. It uses a 
peacekeeping dummy variable whenever any type of third-party enforcer 
was used in a conflict.  
• Post-outcome period: This variable covers the period following the 
respective event outcome, starting one year after the outcome is reached, 
and continuing until another conflict outcome is reached. This logical 
variable counts as TRUE for all years following each category outcome 
while no other outcome is reached. Three types of post-outcome periods 
are coded:  
o Post-government victory period 
o Post-rebel victory period  
o Post-peace agreement period  
Resources (lootable and not-lootable) were divided by type of resource. This 
logical variable codes every year in which the type of resource is produced in a country. 
Seven types of resources are examined, namely four extractive activities and the 
production of three types of illegal drugs: 
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• Extractable resources: 
o Offshore petroleum (used as non-lootable oil production) 
o Onshore petroleum onshore (used as lootable oil production) 
o Lootable diamonds 
o Non-lootable diamonds 
• Production of illegal drugs: These are coded for every country known to 
have produced the following specific drugs. 
o Cannabis 
o Coca bush 
o Opium poppy 
In order to check the results to verify the logic of the model, several control 
variables were selected from previous studies due to their significance for this thesis: 
• Control variables; 
o GDP (LogGDP/capita). The model uses the natural logarithm of 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to control for countries’ 
economic wealth.  
o Population density (Log pop. Density). For population size each 
year, the model uses the natural logarithm of the population 
density.  
o Democracy level. To control for government type, the model uses 
the Polity2 score for each year in the dataset. 
• Interacting variables: The variables to test the interaction between peace 
years and the post-outcome period are:  
o Peace years * Gov. victory period  
o Peace years * Reb. victory period 
o Peace years * Agreement period 
C. STATISTICAL MODEL 
To test the hypotheses, this research uses a logistic regression model with conflict 
recurrence onset as the dependent variable. Since this research is focused on the factors 
influencing the tendency of the country’s internal conflict to recur, the selected unit of 
analysis is country-year. As a country can have simultaneous intrastate conflicts with 
several rebel parties, each country is marked as being in conflict if it has at least one 
intrastate conflict over the threshold of 25 deaths per year. Every year with and without 
conflict is counted consecutively to generate the duration of conflict year and peace year 
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intervals. Every time a conflict reaches its outcome, the respective country year is coded 
with the specific outcome type.  
A conflict recurrence is coded for the specific country every time there is a 
conflict onset after the first conflict onset in the 1946-2014 period. The lootable resources 
were coded 1 for every country-year with known production after the production year 
started. If a specific resource production never started or stopped, the variable was 
counted as 0. To test the hypotheses, the research used several variable combinations and 
interactions. 
Model 1 is the baseline specification model, which includes the variables for the 
type of outcome and the post-outcome periods, and three control variables for the 
countries’ economies, population densities, and democracy levels. Model 2 includes a 
dummy variable for peacekeeping operations. Model 3 includes the four extractive 
lootable resource variables. Model 4 includes the three illegal drugs as lootable resources 
and compares the results without the three control variables. Model 5 includes all the 
variables studied, obtaining the best model with the lowest Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) score. 
D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the results from the different models tested in the regression. This 
table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for the predictor 
variables. Positive coefficients indicate an increased risk of conflict recurrence, and 
negative coefficients indicate a decrease of that risk.  
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Table 2. Logistic regression of intrastate conflict recurrence 
Dependent variable: Conflict Recurrence Onset 
Regression Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Peace years -0.040*** -0.034***  -0.037
*** -0.021* 
 (0.009) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.011) 
Post-agreement period -0.614** -0.565 -0.227 -0.478* -0.403 
 (0.280) (0.364) (0.377) (0.285) (0.380) 
Post-government victory period -0.746*** -0.742*** -0.800*** -0.626*** -0.763*** 
 (0.203) (0.221) (0.218) (0.199) (0.227) 
Post-rebel victory period -0.829** -0.812** -0.519 -0.454 -0.513 
 (0.373) (0.402) (0.410) (0.381) (0.411) 
Peace agreement 1.523*** 1.549*** 1.244** 1.343*** 1.371** 
 (0.494) (0.573) (0.601) (0.517) (0.600) 
Government victory 3.382*** 3.368*** 3.491*** 3.219*** 3.451*** 
 (0.325) (0.352) (0.353) (0.323) (0.364) 
Rebel victory 3.563*** 3.519*** 3.488*** 3.514*** 3.389*** 
 (0.624) (0.648) (0.655) (0.625) (0.654) 
Peacekeeping  -0.486 -0.471  -0.226 
  (0.359) (0.369)  (0.370) 
Offshore petroleum   0.209 0.290
* 0.402** 
   (0.190) (0.165) (0.201) 
Onshore petroleum   0.780
*** 0.347** 0.547*** 
   (0.194) (0.175) (0.212) 
Lootable diamonds   0.877
*** 0.925*** 0.659*** 
   (0.194) (0.169) (0.205) 
Non-lootable diamonds   -0.937
** -0.632** -0.699* 
   (0.374) (0.305) (0.389) 
Cannabis    -0.329 -0.346 
    (0.246) (0.304) 
Coca bush    -1.465
** -1.599 
    (0.733) (1.036) 
Opium poppy    0.684
*** 0.619*** 
    (0.173) (0.204) 
GDP (Log GDP/capita) -0.278*** -0.392*** -0.554***  -0.455
*** 
 (0.077) (0.093) (0.094)  (0.105) 
Democracy level (polity2) -0.005 0.006   0.007 
 (0.012) (0.013)   (0.014) 
Population density (Log pop.density) 0.142** 0.152** 0.157**  0.089 
 (0.059) (0.068) (0.063)  (0.072) 
Constant (Intercept) 0.223 1.075 1.393** -2.965*** 0.613 
 (0.599) (0.707) (0.704) (0.158) (0.779) 
Observations 3,883 2,923 2,977 3,989 2,923 
Log Likelihood -836.051 -637.421 -623.286 -816.528 -604.039 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,694.102 1,298.842 1,274.572 1,663.056 1,246.078 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Data obtained from various sources outlined in this chapter. 
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Analyzing the data, the following results were found for each hypothesis: 
H1: The type of conflict outcome affects its recurrence risk. 
Table 2 shows how, in the year the outcome is reached, the countries experiencing 
a government victory or rebel victory have a higher risk of conflict recurrence than those 
that reached a peace agreement, showing the vulnerability of peace in the period 
following military victories. The three outcomes show statistically significant results in 
the different models. Across the five models, peace agreements consistently show less 
than half the risk of recurrence than the military victories. The government-victory and 
rebel-victory outcomes show differences in the proportion of risk across the models; 
therefore, there is no certainty about which of the two military victories has a lower 
recurrence risk.  
H2: The participation of peacekeeping forces reduces the risk of conflict 
recurrence. 
The results in Table 2 did not show a significant impact of peacekeeping 
operations on the reduction of conflict recurrence. Although the resultant effect shows a 
reduction in the conflict recurrence risk, it has a high margin of error, which is why it 
does not confirm H2. 
H3: The longer the peace duration, the lower the probability of conflict 
recurrence. 
The results in Table 2 show the impact of peace-years reducing the risk of conflict 
recurrence across the different models. This variable consistently shows how over time, 
the risk of conflict recurrence decreases (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  Conflict recurrence risk with peace years 
 
H4: The probability of conflict recurrence varies over time depending on the type 
of previous conflict outcome. 
The regression results do not support a definitive conclusion for this hypothesis. 
When reviewing how successful the type of outcome is, Table 1 shows that the average 
expected duration of peace after a peace agreement is 18.2 years, after a government 
victory is 15.9 years, and after a rebel victory is 14.3 years. In Table 2, when considering 
the results for the full period following each conflict outcome, the variables’ behavior 
changes. In model 1, which has less additional variables, the lowest risk of recurrence is 
for the post-rebel victory period, followed by the post-government victory period, and 
then by the post-agreement period. Models 2 to 5 show the variables that reduce the risk 
of conflict recurrence, but the results lose statistical significance. Although the three 
variables are statistically significant in model 1, only the post-government victory period 
has a statistically significant result across all the models.  
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show how the risk of conflict recurrence after a government 
victory or after a rebel victory decreases over time compared with the other types of post-
outcome periods.67 The solid lines show the predicted probability of conflict recurrence 
                                                 
67 The plots in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 are from model 1.  
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across peace years. The shaded colored bands show the 95 percent confidence intervals 
around the model’s prediction. In both cases, the risk of recurrence is higher in the first 
years after the end of the conflict.   
Figure 2. Conflict recurrence risk after government victory 
  
Figure 3. Conflict recurrence risk after rebel victory 
  
 
A comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 reveals the risk of recurrence is higher 
after a rebel victory, but the risk decreases rapidly, whereas the risk of recurrence after 
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government victory is about 90 percent that of government victory. Over time, however, 
it is almost equal (see Figure 4).68 Additionally, the confidence interval is more accurate 
when predicting the conflict recurrence in the post-government victory period than in 
post-rebel victory period. 
Figure 4. Conflict recurrence risk after government and rebel victory 
  
Figure 5 shows the conflict recurrence risk after a peace agreement. Here the risk 
is similar to the government victory risk, with a slightly higher margin of error.   
                                                 
68 Figure 4 is an artistic creation using Paint 3D. 
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Figure 5. Conflict recurrence risk after peace agreement. 
  
Since the margin of error for post-rebel victory and post-agreement periods are 
higher than their coefficients, there is not enough evidence to conclude which outcome 
would have a lower probability of conflict recurrence over time. 
The results of the two lootable resource hypotheses are described simultaneously: 
H5: Easily lootable resources increase the probability of conflict recurrence. 
H6: Non-lootable resources reduce the probability of conflict recurrence.  
The effect of lootable resources is different from the expected result. Table 2 
shows that non-lootable offshore petroleum does not reduce the risk of conflict 
recurrence, suggesting that this type of resource does not guarantee that the government 
will effectively use it to maintain the obtained peace. Lootable onshore petroleum has the 
expected result, providing conditions that favor conflict recurrence, a condition 
demonstrated with a high statistical significance across several models.  
The effect of diamond mines showed the expected behavior, with lootable 
diamonds increasing the risk of recurrence across the different models, whereas non-
lootable diamonds worked to reduce the recurrence risk. 
The effect of illegal drugs showed mixed results among the three selected drugs. 
Opium cultivation increased the risk of conflict recurrence as expected. On the other 
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hand, the cultivation of cannabis and coca bush both reduced the risk of conflict 
recurrence, although these results are statistically significant for coca bush only in one 
model. The result for cannabis is not statistically significant since the margin of error is 
bigger than the respective coefficient in the two models tested. 
Among the control variables, the GDP per capita had the strongest impact on the 
reduction of conflict recurrence. This result confirms the previous investigations about 
the effect of state capacity and the incidence of internal conflict. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The present study on intrastate conflict recurrence confirms the findings of 
several scholars that the risk of recurrence is higher in the first years after the conflict 
ends. This behavior is the same for the three types of outcome studied, showing a lower 
recurrence risk for conflicts ending in peace agreement. The participation of 
peacekeeping forces does not show a significant reduction in the risk of conflict 
recurrence. Although the result shows a small reduction effect, its magnitude was in the 
same range as the margin of error, so no inferences can be drawn about whether the 
presence of peacekeeping forces affect the risk of conflict recurrence. The presence of 
lootable resources shows different results among the types of resources in the study. Both 
onshore and offshore oil production increase the risk of conflict recurrence, with a higher 
risk of recurrence for onshore production. The findings in the study confirm the effect of 
lootable diamonds increasing the risk of conflict recurrence, whereas non-lootable 
diamonds reduce the risk of conflict recurrence.  
The results for the production of three types of illegal drugs are mixed, with 
opium poppy increasing the risk for conflict recurrence, and coca bush and cannabis 
showing an insignificant effect across the models. The results are not conclusive with 
respect to the illicit drug analysis. According to the results, not all types of illegal drugs 
have the same effect in conflict recurrence. Further review is needed to assess the impact 
of this type of illegal activity. Updated and reliable data are important in order to be able 
to assess the impact of these types of resources.  
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IV. COLOMBIA’S INTERNAL CONFLICT 
The Colombian conflict is historically one of the oldest internal armed conflicts in 
the world. Rooted in inter-parties’ political violence and in the grievances of peasants and 
workers, and boosted by the communist expansion of the 1960s, the conflict continues 
actively in 2018 with one guerrilla group, the ELN, still fighting against the government. 
With a peace agreement with the partially demobilized FARC in its implementation 
phase, and peace talks underway with the last guerrilla group fighting, the conflict is near 
its end. However, the existence of some of the factors related to conflict recurrence 
creates concerns about Colombia’s ability to reconcile in a successful settlement.  
This chapter analyzes the current status of the Colombian conflict, employing the 
logistic regression results reported in Chapter III. The chapter starts with a discussion of 
the origins of the conflict, its evolution, and its main characteristics associated with the 
factors this thesis reviews. Then, it verifies the factors’ effects in the conflict and the way 
these factors have shaped the conflict.  
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE COLOMBIAN INTERNAL CONFLICT  
Colombia’s internal armed conflict is the product of three conditions that shaped 
the first half of the nation’s 20th century: the confrontation of traditional political parties, 
the grievances of peasants and workers, and the expansion of communism in Latin 
America.  
1.  Confrontation of Traditional Political Parties 
Created in the middle of the 19th century, the Liberal Party (1848) and the 
Conservative Party (1849) had different opinions about the government’s relationship 
with the Catholic Church, the role of government in the economy, the protection of 
property rights, and property security.69 Although both parties functioned as unifying 
factors for nation building because they were present throughout the territory and serving 
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as references for cross-social identity, their differences grew during the 19th century. The 
Liberal Party ruled the government after the Constitution of Rionegro (1863-1886) 
consolidated individual liberties. In 1886, a political shift gave the Conservative Party 
control of the government, and a new Constitution gave the government a more 
protectionist character. In 1899, after 13 years in the political opposition and excluded 
from public office, Liberals initiated a revolutionary upheaval known as The One 
Thousand Days War.70 From 1899 to 1902, Colombia was in a civil war until the 
government conservative forces won, when the liberal General Herrera surrendered and 
signed a peace agreement aboard the USS Wisconsin.71  
The political relationship between the parties continued with difficulties. In 1946, 
after 16 years of Liberal control, a Conservative candidate won the presidency, creating 
additional tension between the parties.72 In 1948, the assassination of the Liberal 
politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan began the ten-year period known as La Violencia.73  In 
this period the two main political parties, Liberals and Conservatives, again engaged in a 
bloody fight that extended from Bogota to most cities and countryside regions of 
Colombia. Under the influence of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), peasants 
organized self-defense and guerrilla groups to protect themselves from the attacks of 
Liberals and Conservatives, and started to create self-protected regions in the countryside 
called “independent republics.”74 During this period, some Liberals organized into 
guerrilla squads to fight the Conservative government forces, especially in the eastern 
plains of the country. 
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To end La Violencia, in 1957 the leadership of both Liberals and Conservatives 
made a pact to share power spanning a 16-year period. In the accord, both parties would 
take turns in the Colombian presidency from 1958 to 1974 and would divide power in 
state institutions, taking equal seats in key positions and sharing it with their political 
allies. Although this agreement successfully ended the two-party struggle, it created three 
unexpected results: the exclusion from power of other political parties, the exclusion of 
peasants’ interests in land distribution, and the mobilization of some liberal guerrilla 
remnants to guard the independent peasant republics.  
2. Grievances and the Building of Peasant Organizations 
Land distribution has been Colombian peasants’ grievance since the beginning of 
the 20th century. Big landowners used force to displace the first occupier-peasants who 
colonized the land, and then legalized the landowners’ possession by registering title 
deeds.75 During the 1920s, in an attempt to force reform in land distribution, a land-
oriented peasant uprising against regional elites took place in some Colombian regions. 
Although these uprisings were militarily controlled, they planted the seeds for the future 
resistance movement. From this uprising, the first peasant self-defense groups emerged to 
protect the regions where displaced peasants had moved to find new land for their 
cultures. Expanding the agricultural border into mountainous and jungle areas, the 
peasants created areas free of the influence of both the government and the elite 
landowners. These areas would become important for their evolution 20 years later, 
during the period known as La Violencia, when they were renamed “independent 
republics.” 
3. The Expansion of Communism in Latin America 
In Colombia the communist expansion began after World War I had its most 
visible expression with the establishment of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) in 
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1930.76 Born from remnants of communist organizations that had failed to consolidate 
during the 1920s, the PCC incorporated the grievances of workers, artisans, and peasants 
into its revolutionary character, using a Marxist-Leninist ideology aligned to Soviet 
Union principles.77 In connection with the peasant organization that appeared in early 
self-defense efforts during the 1920s and 1930s, the PCC strengthened its influence 
among peasants during the La Violencia confrontations.  
The Cuban revolution that overcame the Batista regime in December 1958 and the 
subsequent adoption of socialism in revolutionary Cuba during 1961 worked to show that 
“the people in arms” can organize as guerrillas to defeat an oppressor regime. During the 
1960s, several guerrilla movements started in Latin America, and the communists in 
Colombia saw a new opportunity to influence an aggrieved people to rise against the 
government. 
The U.S. Containment Policy in Latin America had focused mainly on stopping 
the rise of socialist governments in the region, with some poor results. An example of 
how this policy backfired was the United States’ covert support for the 1954 overthrow of 
the Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, for his relationship with socialist countries.78 
As a reaction to the Cuban revolution and the communist expansion in Latin America, the 
U.S. government initiated actions to control this risk. In Colombia, the United States 
reoriented its policy and started economic and military cooperation programs to handle 
the issue better. One U.S. initiative, known as the LAZO plan,79 was used by the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas as part of its narrative 
against U.S. intervention.  
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After the Colombian government managed to dismantle the “independent 
republics,” remnants of the Marquetalia independent republic joined with other peasant 
organizations and created the FARC in 1964.80 That same year, oil workers, students, 
members of the Peasant Student Workers Movement (MOEC),81 and priests with a 
Cuban revolutionary ideology created the National Liberation Army (ELN),82 and later 
dissident members of the PCC created the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) with a 
Chinese-Maoist orientation.83 In 1972, radicals from the National Popular Alliance 
(ANAPO) created a fourth guerrilla group named the 19th of April Movement (M-19), 
after the allegedly fraudulent presidential elections of 1970.84 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT 
1. Early Beginning (1964-1978)
Following their creation in the mid-1960s, the three first leftist guerrilla groups 
(FARC, ELN, and EPL) struggled to organize and grow, while the government 
successfully expanded its counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign to defeat them. In its 
early stages, the ELN was the most active group, but internal disputes and Colombian 
Army operations had weakened the group by the mid-1970s.85 This kept the ELN’s 
guerrilla activity at a low level, reducing its actions to isolated rural areas where the 
groups struggled to stay safe from the security forces’ operations. Government programs 
to improve the agricultural and rural conditions worked to reduce the influence and 
expansion of the guerrillas.86  
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Following their almost near-defeat by the mid-1970s, the guerrilla groups 
benefited from the growth and expansion of illicit drug production during the second half 
of the 1970s.87 Offstein states that the areas controlled by the guerrillas offered the lands 
needed for the illicit industry, and the FARC especially gave protection for illicit drug 
cultivation and production.88 Figure 6 shows the three main guerrilla groups’ armed 
actions during the 1960s and 1970s, with an increase of FARC activity in 1977 and 1978.  
Figure 6. Armed actions of the FARC, ELN, and EPL between 1965 and 
1978.89 
For their funding, the guerrilla groups started with peasant contributions and 
criminal activities such as ransom and the extortion of farmers. This funding further 
evolved to kidnappings and the extortion of commerce and oil companies, and bank 
robberies. Although the incursion in drug production provided additional resources, most 
guerrillas continued using robbery, extortion, and kidnapping to earn alternative funds.   
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2. Narcotics Trafficking and the First Peace Processes (1978-1990) 
The guerrilla groups benefited from their relationship with the origin of the drug 
cartels in the second half of the 1970s. The guerrillas provided security for drug 
production, and the cartels provided funds and weapons for the guerrillas. In 1978, when 
the expansion of drug production was evident, Colombian President Turbay Ayala started 
the war on drugs. Despite the counter-drug effort, during the 1980s the narcotics 
trafficking continued to grow, as well as the guerrilla groups’ influence and attacks. As 
mentioned by Offstein, the presence of guerrilla movements is “correlated with drug 
production” in several Colombian departments. He asserts that the biggest size increase 
of the guerrilla movement occurred when the groups became involved in narcotics 
trafficking and illicit activities.90 
The expansion of Colombia’s oil production in this period provided an additional 
source of funding to the guerrilla groups.91 The ELN took advantage of its ties with oil 
worker organizations to extort the oil companies.92 In the 1980s, after being reduced to 
about 40 members,93 the ELN was reborn thanks to millions of dollars received from the 
extortion of oil companies during the construction of the Caño Limón oil pipeline.94 The 
ELN kept its connection to oil extortion, playing “a dominant role in the oil-producing 
area of Barrancabermeja,”95 and other areas with oil production such as Arauca, 
Santander, and Norte de Santander departments. Since this period, the ELN and the 
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FARC especially benefited from the taxing of oil enterprises, “using kidnaps [sic], 
extortion, and bombings of oil pipelines as leverage.”96 
During the term of President Belisario Betancourt, peace negotiations led to a 
short-lived ceasefire with several guerrilla groups in 1984.97 As a result of these peace 
negotiations with the Colombian government, some FARC members demobilized and 
created the Patriotic Union Party (UP) but did not dismantle the FARC’s armed 
capabilities. Even more, FARC’s armed actions during that period made this guerrilla 
movement look like the military wing of the UP party, diminishing the trust in this 
political organization and making it a target of counter-leftist organizations. Divisions 
arose among FARC insurgents, and some of them also targeted members of the UP 
party.98 This political party disappeared after the killing of most of its members, a 
situation that reinforced the armed agenda in the FARC organization. 
During the early 1980s, due to guerrilla kidnappings of drug cartel members’ 
relatives, drug dealers organized the group Death to Kidnappers (MAS) to find and kill 
the kidnapper guerrillas. This group later transformed into self-defense groups99 by 
joining landowners’ and cattle breeders’ security groups100 to organize the United Self-
Defenses of Colombia (AUC). Funded through cattle ranchers’ money, and in some cases 
drug production, the AUC was able to contest the guerrillas’ advances in several regions 
of the country by using selective killings and massacres.101   
During the presidency of Virgilio Barco, peace negotiations with the M-19 
concluded with the demobilization of this guerrilla group on November 2, 1989. As part 
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of this negotiation, a new political constitution was created for Colombia, and the M-19 
became a political party.102 This peace process with M-19 worked since the former 
guerrilla members obtained 19 of the 70 seats in the National Constituent Assembly, the 
board assigned to build a new political constitution for the country. In the same way, 
during the 1990 elections, the M-19 obtained 22 seats of Congress.103 With these results, 
the M-19 members succeeded in their political objective to gain political representation. 
Later, in 1991, the EPL demobilized and some of its members join the M-19 
political party,104 while a small dissident group within it decided to continue fighting the 
government in the Norte de Santander department.105 These EPL dissidents’ stronghold 
is in the rich region of Catatumbo, located on the border with Venezuela where cocaine is 
cultivated and produced. This EPL dissident group is nowadays still active and strangely 
coexists with the stronger ELN. 
It seems that for most M-19 and some EPL members, the political inclusion of 
some of the guerrilla group members in politics was enough to counter the effect of 
narcotics trafficking funds that was used by guerrillas to attract their constituents and 
resume the conflict. 
3. The FARC’s Strongest Period (1991-2002) 
After the demobilization of the M-19 and the EPL, the FARC became the 
strongest guerrilla organization in Colombia, followed by the ELN. Both groups were 
able to control areas of the country while simultaneously fighting government security 
forces. In this period, the violence reached high levels due to the United Self-defense of 
Colombia (AUC) killings to counter the guerrilla expansion. The second half of the 1990s 
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was characterized by the FARC military expansion. In several isolated areas, the FARC 
was able to conduct attacks against small towns and patrolling army units, which ended 
in the killing and capture of many police and army members.106  
In the period between 1994 and 2002, the FARC was able to threaten the military 
capabilities of the state by defeating army and marine bases in the jungles, attacking 
populations, destroying national police stations, and beginning to surround Bogota, the 
Colombian capital city, and other Department capitals.107 This period was also marked 
by the loss of credibility of the Colombian presidency after allegations of drug cartels’ 
money being used in the presidential campaign of the elected president, Ernesto Samper. 
The loss of credibility resulted in the loss of political, economic, and military support of 
the United States to Colombia.108  
During this period, the FARC showed an increasing military capability supported 
by the revenue obtained by drug trafficking, which allowed the guerrilla force to expand 
its armed men to more than 18,000,109 with about an equivalent quantity in its supporting 
network. This expansion, initiated after the FARC’s Eight Conference in 1993,110 
showed that the guerrilla organization was working on the implementation of its strategic 
plan, named the Bolivarian Campaign for the New Colombia, aimed at increasing its 
armed force and isolating Bogota. This strategy brought the war to the population living 
in Colombia’s centers of power, who witnessed how the government’s security forces 
were losing the fight for control of the country. Kidnappings, murders, and drug 
trafficking rose while the government showed an inability to control the guerrillas’ 
advancement. This period is also led to the massive expansion of self-defense groups 
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created by the population to oppose the expansion of the FARC and other guerrilla 
organizations, which created a situation of mass human rights violations. 
In 1998, Colombians elected Andres Pastrana for president, favoring his initiative 
for peace in a context where the FARC had obtained such victories over the government 
armed forces that the best option for most Colombians was to sign a peace agreement 
before the FARC was able to take power by force. The peace negotiations, conducted in 
the Caguan region, were used by the FARC to obtain international visibility and to show 
it was like a state inside Colombia. President Pastrana granted the FARC 42,000 square 
kilometers of land to act as a free zone where the FARC become the only authority.111 
The FARC used this area as a strategic rearguard to recruit and train new members, as 
well as a stronghold from which to launch new attacks on the population and the military, 
and to send kidnapped hostages.112 The last four years of this period were characterized 
by the FARC’s advance towards Bogota, the Colombian people’s fear of traveling by 
land or by plane, and the sense that the government was losing the fight against the 
guerrillas. 
4. The Last Period (2002 to present) 
However, by 2002 the scenario was different for the FARC. The 9/11 attacks in 
the United States had changed the world’s perception of the FARC. The U.S. government 
authorized the use of the resources previously designated exclusively to aid the war on 
drugs to be used to fight the FARC. Additionally, the “Colombian Plan” provided new 
resources to train and equip the Colombian army.113 After the failure of the peace 
process in 2002, the Colombian citizens elected Alvaro Uribe as president with a 
different mandate: this time the Colombian voters selected the full use of the state force 
to defeat the guerrilla groups. Uribe’s government reduced the guerrillas’ advance over 
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Bogota and other cities and signed a justice submission agreement with the AUC 
leadership, demobilizing nearly 31,000 AUC members between 2005 and 2007.114 Since 
the AUC represented a threat for the guerrilla groups in the case of a weapons release, the 
demobilization of this self-defense movement would seem to suggest that the guerrillas 
would have an additional incentive for negotiation. However, negotiations with the 
guerrilla groups did not succeed. What did happen is that remnants from the AUC 
expanded their actions into the illicit drug business. With no objective other than to 
control the areas for drug cultivation, narcotics production, and narcotics trafficking, 
these groups became criminal gangs (BACRIM). 
After eight years of intense counterinsurgency offensives led by the government 
of President Uribe (2002-2010), President Juan Manuel Santos took a new approach that 
allowed the start of peace negotiations with the FARC in 2012.115 This negotiation 
concluded in November 2016 with the signing of a peace accord that allowed the 
reintegration of most FARC leadership and cadres.116  In the same way, in 2014, the 
Santos government and the ELN publicly announced that they had started exploratory 
talks since January to create an agenda for formal peace negotiations.117 While the 
negotiations with the FARC advanced, however, the ELN’s armed activity increased, not 
only in the traditionally ELN areas of influence, but also in other places where the ELN 
presence had been reduced in the previous decade. On March 30, 2016, the government 
announced the end of the exploratory dialogs, and in February 8, 2017, the negotiators of 
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the government and the ELN started peace negotiations.118 Shockingly, the intensity and 
frequency of the ELN attacks continued as dissident factions of the FARC joined the 
ELN.  
While the government and the FARC reached a peace agreement in November 
2016 that demobilized most of that guerrilla group, some members of the group decided 
the agreement did not provide better conditions than what they had if they continued the 
fight. The agreement gave the FARC five seats in the Senate and five in the Chamber of 
Representatives for eight years,119 distribution of land properties, projects for economic 
development, and even a monthly salary for the former guerrilla combatants. That peace 
agreement also had provisions for a United Nations political mission of unarmed 
international observers120 to monitor and accompany the actors in the peace effort and 
enhance the trust and commitment of the FARC and the government. This peace 
agreement is currently in its implementation phase, but several dissident factions 
withdrew from the accord and decided to return to their activities, or to join the ELN in 
its effort to control the areas that the FARC abandoned.121 While the negotiation with the 
FARC proposed economic incentives for the voluntary eradication of coca crops, the 
amount of land cultivated increased from 50,000 hectares in 2014 to 171,000 hectares in 
2018,122 providing an expected increase on resources to fund the rebels’ fight against the 
government. The future of the agreement with the FARC and the negotiation with the 
ELN has, in the increase of coca cultivation, a new threat that the government has to 
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control. In addition, the BACRIM activity represents another threat for the security of the 
space needed for peace to last. 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS’ INFLUENCE IN THE CONFLICT 
This section analyzes the Colombian internal conflict using the results obtained in 
Chapter III. Emphatically, the internal conflicts originated in the first half of the 20th 
century; the One Thousand Days War and La Violencia had a political bipartisan 
character, which was settled by government military victory in the case of the former, and 
by negotiation in the case of the latter.123 The fact that La Violencia created the peasant 
self-defense groups that later became the pro-communist guerrillas of the mid-1960s  
make the guerrillas’ confrontation a recurrence during the La Violencia conflict. 
Alternatively, this conflict relapse was a self-defense response to the campaign launched 
by the government to take control of the independent republics. The decision to organize 
and fight to overcome the government was encouraged by a foreign, communist ideology. 
Testing the H1, the logistic regression shows that conflicts ending in both 
government victory and rebel victory have a higher probability of recurrence than peace 
agreements. Ending internal conflicts in Colombia has been traditionally difficult since 
remnants from the rebels have found a way to resume their fight or to join other illegally 
armed organizations. The initial military successes that the government had by the mid-
1970s did not stop the guerrilla groups from rebuilding their strength and, after some 
years, the conflict relapsed. These past experiences show the difficulties the government 
has had in militarily defeating the armed insurgencies.  
In Colombia, peace negotiations between the government and the guerrilla groups 
have had mixed results, depending on the actors’ perspective on the benefits the 
negotiation could provide. The peace negotiations of the early 1980s failed due to the 
lack of commitment among some rebel groups, and the action of spoilers in the 
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the state government. 
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government and among extreme-right groups. These negotiations showed how the 
guerrilla groups used the peace talks as a strategy to reorganize and to increase their 
international visibility. This was a behavior that the FARC displayed during the Caguan 
negotiations with President Pastrana in 1999-2002. Despite these negative results, from 
the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, some peace negotiations did produce 
a lasting peace, as is the case with the M-19, and, with less success, with the EPL and the 
AUC. These three negotiations showed that the groups’ commitment during the 
negotiation lasted into the peace period. If the negotiation continues and the agreement is 
signed, then there is a good probability of peace success. However, dissidents from 
demobilized groups and remaining fighters have traditionally found space to join other 
insurgencies or criminal organizations involved in illicit drug production and trafficking, 
thus maintaining the risk of a new conflict beginning. Although the political choices and 
the commitment of the actors are not tested in this thesis, it seems to influence their 
decisions in Colombia where the actors have access to drug trafficking funding. 
In the H3 test, the effect of time showed a positive correlation with more peace 
years producing a lower risk of conflict recurrence. The effect of maintaining the peace 
for longer periods does reduce the probability of recurrence, but in order to make it work, 
the government has to take measures to change the perceptions of the population. In 
Colombian history, the mechanism of the National Front worked well to finish the fight 
among Liberals and Conservatives. In the same way, the provisions for the agreement 
with the M-19 prevented this guerrilla group from restarting its fight. However, some 
remaining fighters in both cases joined existent rebel groups to continue their fight.  
The test of H4 shows statistically significant results for government victory across 
the models, but does not show it for peace agreements and rebel victory. However, the 
experience in the conflict in Colombia shows that the peace agreements have longer 
periods of peace, at least among the actors involved in the agreement. Arguably, the only 
military victory the government has won over the rebels was during the One Thousand 
Days War when the Liberals surrendered to the government Conservative forces. But 
even in that moment, the end of the conflict was settled in a peace agreement. The 
experience with the leftist guerrillas in the 1960s and 1970s shows how the military 
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superiority of the government worked to reduce the rebels’ activity, but it did not 
guarantee peace. 
Note that in Colombia, there has not been the participation of peacekeeping 
forces, and the test of H2 does not confirm the effect of peacekeeping forces on the 
reduction of the conflict recurrence risk. The peace agreement between the Colombian 
government and the FARC has a political mission under the UN Department of Political 
Affairs. Nevertheless, this political mission is not considered a peacekeeping mission and 
its main purpose is to work as an observer of the government and FARC binding to the 
accord. 
While the test of H5 shows ambiguous results depending on the type of lootable 
resource, the Colombian experience with oil production and illegal drug production 
confirms the negative effect of these resources on the peace process. In the conflict in 
Colombia, the lootable resources have produced conflict recurrence and have helped the 
conflict to last. The ELN used the extortion of oil companies to resume its organization in 
the 1980s and continues using the oil industry as its main target. Currently the ELN 
maintains a presence in the oil-producing regions of Colombia’s border with Venezuela. 
The FARC’s increase in activity after the mid-1970s shows how the relapse of 
violence was influenced by the use of illegal drug-related funds. Funds from narcotics 
trafficking have strengthened the FARC and the other guerrilla groups since the 1980s. 
Those guerrilla organizations that demobilized during the early 1990s had many cadres 
moving into the narcotics business, but it is probable that the political access obtained in 
those negotiations avoided the failure of those peace processes. The same behavior is 
found in the remnants of the demobilized AUC in the 2000s, known now as BACRIM. 
Several BACRIM gangs are involved in the production and trafficking of cocaine, and 
have made it the core of its criminal activity. In some regions of Colombia, the BACRIM 
and the guerrilla groups have built networks to protect profitable drug trafficking from 
the government security forces.  
In the test of H5, the presence of coca crops and cannabis crops show a reduction 
in the risk of conflict recurrence. The fact that the reduction is not statistically significant 
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could be an indicator that the dissident groups may want to continue with control of the 
illicit drug business, but its willingness to fight the government could be limited to the 
protection of the illicit enterprise. However, the effect of these crops increasing the 
strength of the rebel groups, and consequently the length of the conflict, increases the 
need for controlling this illegal activity. Although narcotics trafficking could allegedly 
reduce the share of the leftist doctrines in the guerrilla groups, the effect of maintaining 
interconnected criminal networks with the BACRIM is a destabilizing factor to consider. 
This network associated with transnational narcotics trafficking creates additional bridges 
that can provide access to other illegal markets like the black weapons markets. With the 
power that drug-related funds provide, it is easier for the guerrilla organizations to have 
access to more sophisticated and powerful weapons. This, combined with increased 
production in the drug cultivation area in Colombia adds the peasant population to this 
factor, because they also derive their livelihood from the illicit crops. This population 
sees the guerrillas as the protector of their culture, and consequently, any action the 
government takes to destroy drug cultivation activities goes against that population’s 
interests. 
As the implementation phase of the peace process with the FARC is in progress, 
the Colombian government has to identify the way to tackle the expansion of illicit drug 
cultivation, without creating a new source of recruits for the FARC dissidents, the ELN, 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As stated in this and previous research, intrastate conflicts are the most frequent 
and long-lasting form of war in the world124 that, additionally, have a high tendency to 
recur.125 Using a logistic regression analysis, this thesis searches for the conditions and 
factors affecting conflict recurrence and lasting peace in intrastate confrontations. 
Specifically, this work tests the effect of three factors: the type of conflict outcome, the 
use of peacekeeping forces, and the presence of lootable resources. The results of the 
statistical analysis are used as a lens to review the internal conflict in Colombia in order 
to identify how these three factors have shaped this conflict. 
A. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The logistic regression shows the positive impact of peace years reducing the risk 
of conflict recurrence across the different models. This variable consistently shows how 
the risk of conflict recurrence decreases over time, agreeing with previous analyses’ 
results.126 This result indicates that the higher risk of recurrence exists in the first years 
of the conflict outcome and thus, this is the moment when higher attention and support is 
required from the international community and from the actors previously involved in the 
conflict, to avoid conflict recurrence.  
The statistical analysis also shows how different outcomes produce different 
levels of recurrence risk. In the results, the negotiated settlement produces at least half of 
the risk of conflict recurrence than military victories. These results are significant for 
peace agreement outcomes regarding the use of peacekeeping forces, the effect of which 
does not show a statistically significant value reducing the conflict recurrence risk. The 
test of the variation over time of the risk for the three outcomes does not allow this thesis 
to draw a definite conclusion. Therefore, additional research is required. 
                                                 
124 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75. 
125 Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,” 2. 
126 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 189. 
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The internal conflict in Colombia has had several peace agreements with different 
guerrilla groups. These agreements have obtained different results. In some cases, the 
negotiations did not conclude with an agreement between the actors and were used by the 
rebel side as a way to obtain higher political and military advantage. A case illustrating 
this behavior was the negotiation with the FARC during the presidency of Andres 
Pastrana (1998-2002).127 In those cases, where the negotiation concluded with an 
agreement, the action of spoilers and dissident groups reduced the effectiveness of the 
accord. Allegedly in these cases, the main factor reducing the probability of recurrence 
has been the government’s lack of mechanisms to consolidate the areas where the 
demobilized guerrilla group had influence. The most successful agreement was 
negotiated with the M-19, which allowed for the reintegration of most guerrilla members 
into society.128  
In the statistical analysis, the effect of lootable resources in the probability of 
conflict recurrence shows ambiguous results, with diamonds affecting as predicted, but 
with oil and illegal drug production showing different and inconsistent results. Non-
lootable diamonds show a reduction in the risk of conflict recurrence, whereas lootable 
diamonds show an increase in the risk of recurrence. The production of onshore 
petroleum shows an increase of conflict recurrence, but offshore petroleum does not 
show a statistically significant effect. Among the cultivation of illicit drugs, opium 
production shows expected behavior increasing the risk of conflict recurrence, but coca 
and cannabis crops show a tendency to reduce the risk of recurrence, although their 
results are not statistically significant.  
Despite the fact that the linear regression does not show a relevant effect of the 
coca and cannabis crops in the probability of conflict recurrence, the influence of these 
crops has stopped the resolution of the conflict in Colombia. The military success 
obtained by the government during the late 1960s and early 1970s against the nascent 
leftist guerrilla groups did not produce a lasting peace, due to the effect of illicit drug 
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153. 
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production. Similarly, the extortion of oil companies has contributed to the relapse of the 
conflict and, together with coca production, has increased the conflict duration by 
providing additional incentives to dissident guerrilla groups  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This work proposes three levels of recommendations to reduce the probability of 
internal conflict recurrence. The first is at the state level regarding mechanisms to settle 
an internal conflict, and the provisions to establish governance in contested areas and in 
areas with lootable resources available. Since the statistical analysis and Colombia’s 
conflict show that negotiated settlements have a better result than military victories, when 
an internal conflict ends with a military victory, the winning actor should provide 
conditions to close the conflict with the opposing actor in a negotiation. This would not 
only reduce the risk of the conflict relapse, but would probably prevent the onset of a new 
conflict with another actor threatening the obtained victory. In the same way, since the 
access to lootable resources would probably increase the emergence of dissidents and 
spoilers, special attention is required to control the regions where these resources exist. 
Providing security measures to these resources and facilities for communities’ livelihood 
could reduce the destabilizing effect of lootable resources. 
The second recommendation, at the international community level, is related to 
the support to countries that have found an outcome to an internal conflict. The 
international community should take actions to help stabilize the country. These actions 
should start as soon as possible in order to increase the probability of peace success. The 
actions should provide incentives to create an agreement among the confronted actors, 
which includes the conditions for the return of former combatants to productive activities 
and their reintegration into society. Other actions could include favorable conditions for 
the export of agricultural products farmed in the regions of conflict. These and other 
actions should aim to support the substitution of drug production efforts through 
productivity programs that guarantee the production will be purchased. Similar efforts 
can enhance the basic services for the communities in affected areas, such as access to 
potable water, education, and health services.   
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The third level of recommendations is for Colombia’s specific situation. The 
government should increase actions to avoid the proliferation of dissidents. These actions 
should start by providing the guerrillas concentrated in temporary hamlet zones the 
services included in the peace agreement. It is important to implement the actions to 
comply with the agreement faster, to send a signal of government commitment during the 
early years, which are the years with higher risk of agreement failure. Provisions for 
expanding governance to the regions where the FARC demobilized should include law 
enforcement infrastructure. This law enforcement infrastructure should be prioritized in 
the zones affected by illegal drug production, since these are the places where competing 
illegal groups will try to establish operation zones. Also, as the past experiences in 
Colombia show, the spaces for political participation of the former combatants should be 
maintained since this is a way to reduce the probability of conflict relapse. 
Finally, the effectiveness of the Colombian government to comply with the peace 
agreement, control the regions the FARC has left, and counter the spread of dissidents 
will enhance the credibility of the government’s commitment and increase its bargaining 
power in the negotiations with the ELN.  
C. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The main limitation for the research was access to information directly from the 
source. With up-to-date information from multilateral organizations such as the UN, it is 
possible to develop better analysis and better responses. This in turn can generate better 
recommendations to these organizations’ response. The UN can increase the resources 
available to researchers in the topics related to the organization’s intervention in different 
conflicts. A systematic coding of the activities that peacekeeping and political missions 
develop can create better tools to increase the understanding of lasting peace or conflict 
recurrences. This can help the UN prepare better responses to different conflicts and thus 
guarantee better results after each intervention. With information properly classified and 
structured, the UN can reduce intervention costs while increasing effectiveness.  
Future research analyzing the effect of lootable resources and testing different 
types of resources at the country level is also needed. Testing the effect of resources in 
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the municipalities where the conflict has taken place can improve the understanding of 
the mechanisms influencing conflict recurrence. With an increase in the systems used for 
data processing and the new developments in big data analyses, it is possible to integrate 
other sources of information. Integrating different datasets with information at the 
municipality level can generate a better understanding of the effects that different human 
activities produce in conflict recurrence. 
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